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Wimmer Wins FLP
Annual Exclusions
By Wendy C. Gerzog
In Wimmer,1 the Tax Court held that a taxpayer’s
gifts of family limited partnership interests were
not eligible for the annual exclusion, but it did
allow annual exclusions for the income streams
from those gifts. The court analogized the income
flow from the FLP’s dividend-paying marketable
securities to what it considered a similar trust
arrangement and allowed the donor five years of
annual exclusions — thus allowing Wimmer to take
all.
In 1996 and 1997, the decedent, George H. Wim-
mer, and his wife combined their trusts and formed
an FLP under California law, with the partnership
agreement executed June 27, 1996. The agreement
restricted transferability by requiring prior consent
of the general partners and 70 percent of the limited
partners, and by imposing additional requirements
for a transferee to become a substitute limited
partner.2 However, gifts or bequests to related par-
ties3 were exempt from those requirements. In No-
vember 1997 the FLP was reorganized under
Georgia law. The provisions remained intact except
for the substitution of Georgia’s statutes for Califor-
nia’s. In the years 1996 to 2000, the taxpayer made
gifts of FLP stock to related parties who were then
listed as limited partners. The parties stipulated the
taxable value of the gifts after applying annual
exclusions.
The FLP agreement stated that the entity’s pur-
pose was to invest its assets — which were envi-
sioned to include ‘‘stock, bonds, notes, securities,
and other personal property and real estate,’’4 but in
fact consisted solely of marketable dividend-paying
securities5 — in order to ‘‘increase family wealth,
control the division of family assets, restrict non-
family rights to acquire such family assets and, by
using the annual gift tax exclusion, transfer prop-
erty to younger generations without fractionalizing
family assets.’’6 According to the agreement, profits
were to be distributed proportionally and in cash
from partnership income. From 1996 to 1998, the
FLP distributed cash for payment of federal income
tax. In 1999 and 2000, the FLP distributed all
dividends less partnership expenses when the divi-
dends were received. Also, the limited partners
withdrew from their capital accounts, for example,
to pay their personal mortgage loans.7
The court reviewed the statute, regulations, and
some case law8 dealing with the annual exclusion
1Wimmer v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2012-157, Doc 2012-
12044, 2012 TNT 108-8.
2Id. at 2-3. Those requirements for the transferee are that he
‘‘(1) accepts and assumes all terms and provisions of the
partnership agreement; (2) provides, in the case of an assignee
who is a trustee, a complete copy of the applicable trust
instrument authorizing the trustee to act as partner in a part-
nership; (3) executes such other documents as the general
partners may reasonably require; and (4) is accepted as a
substitute limited partner by unanimous written consent of the
general partners and the limited partners.’’ Id. at 3.
3Related parties include ‘‘descendants and ancestors, or an
estate or trust the sole beneficiaries of which are one or more
descendants or ancestors of a Partner, a [qualified terminable
interest property] trust under Code section 2056(b)(7) or similar
irrevocable trust for a Partner’s spouse, provided that the
remainder beneficiaries of the trust consist exclusively of the
Partner’s descendants or ancestors.’’ Id. at 4.
4Id. at 5.
5Id. at 6. The FLP held only that type of asset throughout the
tax years at issue. Id.
6Id. at 5.
7Id. at 6-7.
8Section 2503(b); Reg. section 25.2503-3(a) and (b); and
Fronden v. Commissioner, 324 U.S. 18 (1945); Hackl v. Commis-
sioner, 118 T.C. 279 (2002), Doc 2002-7590, 2002 TNT 60-9, aff’d,
335 F.3d 664 (7th Cir. 2003), Doc 2003-16504, 2003 TNT 135-8;
Wendy C. Gerzog
Wendy C. Gerzog is a
professor at the University
of Baltimore School of Law.
In Wimmer, the Tax Court
held that the income stream
from a taxpayer’s gifts of
family limited partnership
interests was eligible for the
annual exclusion. By com-
paring the income interest in
the partnership’s dividend-
paying marketable securities to the income interest
in a trust, the court made Wimmer a winner. But
does the opinion logically lead to that conclusion?
Copyright 2013 Wendy C. Gerzog.
All rights reserved.
tax notes
®
ESTATE AND GIFT RAP
(Footnote continued in next column.) (Footnote continued on next page.)
TAX NOTES, January 28, 2013 489
(C
) Tax A
nalysts 2013. A
ll rights reserved. Tax A
nalysts does not claim
 copyright in any public dom
ain or third party content.
and stated that to qualify for that benefit, the donee
must receive ‘‘a substantial present economic ben-
efit by reason of use, possession, or enjoyment (1) of
property or (2) of income from the property.’’9
Because the transfer was a gift of a limited partner-
ship interest, the court compared that interest to a
traditional interest in trust.10 Since the FLP agree-
ment restricted the donees’ transfer rights, ‘‘the
donees did not receive unrestricted and noncontin-
gent rights to immediate use, possession, or enjoy-
ment of the limited partnership interests’’11;
therefore, the donor’s transfer of the FLP interests
did not qualify for the annual exclusion.
The court then addressed whether the donees
received a present interest in their right to receive
FLP income. Citing Calder,12 the court said the test
required proof that ‘‘(1) the partnership would
generate income, (2) some portion of that income
would flow steadily to the donees, and (3) that
portion of income could be readily ascertained.’’13
The court held that in each year of FLP interest gifts,
the partnership expected to produce income. More-
over, because of the general partners’ fiduciary
duties, ‘‘some portion of partnership income was
expected to flow steadily to the limited partners.’’14
The grandchildren’s trust contained only the FLP
interest, which under the trust documents could not
be liquidated or exchanged for cash. The FLP’s only
asset was dividend-paying stock. The court noted
that the FLP’s only business was investing market-
able securities, which the court equated with
dividend-paying stock:
This investment, when combined with part-
nership purposes to increase partners’ net
worth and transfer wealth using the annual
gift tax exclusion, suggests that the partner-
ship was created with the intent to make
periodic distributions to the limited partners.
Indeed, the limited partners not only received
annual distributions but also had access to
capital account withdrawals to pay down resi-
dential mortgages, among other reasons. In-
tent notwithstanding, the expectation that
some portion of partnership income would
flow steadily to the limited partners is sup-
ported by the general partners’ fiduciary du-
ties owed to the trustee of the Grandchildren
Trust.15
Further, the court stated that FLP distributions of
income were necessary each year in order for the
grandchildren’s trust, which had no other income
source, to pay its income tax liabilities. For those
reasons, the court concluded that ‘‘the general part-
ners were obligated to distribute a portion of part-
nership income each year to the trustee.’’16 Thus,
the court held that the taxpayer proved that some
amount of income ‘‘was expected to flow steadily to
the limited partners.’’ The court contrasted Wimmer
to Hackl and Price in that in Wimmer, as general
partner of the FLP, the donor was required to make
— and did make — distributions of income in each
year at issue.
The court held that the gift of income flowing to
the donees was easily ascertainable. The stock was
publicly traded and produced a dividend; thus, the
donees ‘‘could estimate their allocation of quarterly
dividends on the basis of the stock’s dividend
history and their percentage ownership in the part-
nership.’’17
Calder
In Calder, the artist’s widow transferred his art-
work to four trusts, one for each of her two children
and one trust each for two sets of grandchildren.
The court held that her transfers to the four trusts
with a total of six beneficiaries were six separate
gifts, were entitled to blockage discounts for each
gift separately valued using actual sales prices for
each gift, and were not eligible for any annual
exclusions.18
The terms of the two children’s trusts were the
same: Each required that all net income be paid
‘‘periodically’’ to the beneficiary during her life. The
grandchildren’s trusts provided for like net income
payments in equal shares to them or to their issue.
All the trusts provided that the trustees in ‘‘their
absolute and uncontrolled discretion’’ could make
payments of principal as they deemed advisable for
the welfare of the beneficiaries without any ac-
countability for those decisions throughout the
term of the trust.19 Under those same conditions,
the trustees could hold (without being limited to
trust or chancery investments provided by law),
sell, convey, or exchange both income-producing
and non-income-producing property.20 Finally, the
Price v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2010-2, Doc 2010-111, 2010
TNT 2-9. aff’d, 335 F.3d 664 (7th Cir. 2003), Doc 2003-16504, 2003
TNT 135-8.
9T.C. Memo. 2012-157 at 9, citing Hackl, 118 T.C. at 293.
10T.C. Memo. 2012-157 at 9, citing Hackl, 118 T.C. at 292.
11T.C. Memo. 2012-157 at 10.
12Calder v. Commissioner, 85 T.C. 713, 727-728 (1985).
13T.C. Memo. 2012-157 at 10.
14Id. at 11.
15Id. at 12-13, n.9.
16Id. at 13.
17Id. at 14.
1885 T.C. at 713.
19Id. at 715-716.
20Id. at 716.
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trust agreement stated that it was irrevocable and
that the grantor could not revoke, change, or annul
any of its provisions, and that it was governed by
the laws of New York state.21
The court addressed the annual exclusions by
explaining that the statute requires that gifts must
be present interests — that is, other than gifts of
future interests in property.22 The regulations define
a present interest in property as ‘‘an unrestricted
right to the immediate use, possession, or enjoy-
ment of property or the income from property (such
as a life estate or term certain).’’23 Citing Fronden,
the Calder court said the donee must have ‘‘the right
to substantial present economic benefit.’’ By con-
trast, the court explained that when there were
limitations on the payment of trust income, as in
Disston,24 or when there was no evidence in the
trust or ‘‘surrounding circumstances that a steady
flow of some ascertainable portion of income to the
(beneficiary) would be required,’’ the gift would be
determined to be a gift of future interest. Thus, the
Calder court stated Disston’s three requirements to
qualify for the annual exclusion as: ‘‘(1) that the
trust will receive income, (2) that some portion of
that income will flow steadily to the beneficiary,
and (3) that the portion of income flowing out to the
beneficiary can be ascertained.’’25
The donor argued that the trustees had discre-
tionary power to convert those assets to income-
producing ones and that under state law governing
the trusts, the trustees had a fiduciary duty to sell
those assets and acquire income-producing prop-
erty.26 However, according to the court, the donor
had not satisfied even the first element of that test.
When the property was transferred to the trust, the
trust property consisted only of the deceased artist’s
work, and there was no evidence that the trust
would produce distributable income for the benefi-
ciaries. Rather, the record lacked proof that the
beneficiaries would receive any income.27
Moreover, even if a present interest were created,
it could not be valued, because it was ‘‘impossible
to predict with certainty whether and to what
extent the trustees would sell the gouaches and
invest in income-producing property.’’28 Finally,
there was no evidence of any sales and subsequent
purchase of income-producing property.29
Hackl
A.J. Hackl and his wife formed a limited liability
company (Treeco) in which they each were 50
percent owners. Hackl, as Treeco’s manager, had the
power to make pro rata cash distributions. Until the
company’s dissolution, no one could withdraw
capital contributions, partition any company prop-
erty, or withdraw or transfer an interest without the
manager’s approval, which would be granted in
Hackl’s sole discretion.30
At the end of 1995, the Hackls began making gifts
of their LLC interests to their family members. Over
the next few years, they continued making gifts of
successor LLC interests (Hacklco and Treesource),
which perpetuated the various tree farming opera-
tions of Treeco. Each of those entities had the goals
of long-term income production and appreciation.
At no time were there any profits or distributions to
LLC members.31
Because they had made direct outright gifts of
their LLC interests, the Hackls contended that they
were entitled to annual exclusions for them. How-
ever, both the Tax Court and the Seventh Circuit
rejected that argument and looked to the LLC
agreement to determine whether the donees had
received any immediate, substantial economic
value.
The Tax Court rejected the Hackls’ arguments
because the donees could not dissolve the company
without Hackl’s approval and because there was no
LLC income. The circuit court agreed, saying, ‘‘Al-
though the voting shares that the Hackls gave away
had the same legal rights as those that they re-
tained, Treeco’s restrictions on the transferability of
the shares meant that they were essentially without
immediate value to the donees.’’32
Price
Walter M. Price created an FLP to sell his busi-
ness, Diesel Power Equipment Co. (DPEC). Price
Management Corp., a Nebraska company owned
by Mr. and Mrs. Price’s revocable trusts and of
which Mr. Price was the president, became the
FLP’s 1 percent general partner, and the two revo-
cable trusts each became a 49.5 percent limited
partner. FLP assets consisted of DPEC stock and
commercial real estate leased to DPEC and another
company. Almost four months later, the FLP sold
the DPEC stock and replaced it with marketable
securities.
From the time of the FLP’s creation and every
year for the next five years, the Prices each made
21Id. at 717.
22Id. at 727.
23Reg. section 25.2503-3(b).
24Commissioner v. Disston, 325 U.S. 442 (1945).
2585 T.C. at 727-728.
26Id. at 729.
27Id. at 728.
28Id.
29Id. at 730.
30118 T.C. at 282-283.
31Id. at 284-286.
32335 F.3d at 667-668.
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equal gifts of FLP interests to their three adult
children. The primary purpose of the FLP was to
derive a long-term, reasonable compounded rate of
return on the FLP’s investments.33 Partners were
prohibited from transferring their interests to a
non-partner without the written consent of all part-
ners, and assignment to a non-partner would give
the assignee only a right to his appropriate share of
FLP profits without relieving him of his liabilities
under the FLP agreement.34 The FLP and each
remaining partner could purchase an assignee’s
interest for fair market value. Although the FLP
agreement provided for the FLP’s 25-year existence,
two-thirds of the partners could agree to an earlier
dissolution. The FLP agreement provided that
either the general partner, in his discretion, or a
majority of all the FLP interests would decide when
FLP profits would be distributed. Under the FLP
agreement, controlled by Nebraska law, there was
no requirement to make distributions even for the
purpose of paying taxes on FLP profits.35
The Prices claimed annual exclusions for their
gifts of FLP interests. They contended that the
partners could freely transfer FLP interests among
themselves and that they had present income rights
because they could assign their interest to third
parties. They maintained that Hackl was both incor-
rect and distinguishable.
The court held against the taxpayers and stated
that a present interest is an unrestricted and non-
contingent right to the property or its income and
that a fiduciary’s discretion to withhold income
payments negates the present interest requirement.
To qualify for the annual exclusion, the donor must
give the income beneficiary an immediate right to
enjoy substantial economic benefits in the trans-
ferred property. Under the FLP agreement, the
donors’ children could not unilaterally make with-
drawals from their capital accounts or sell, assign,
or transfer their interests to third parties. As in
Hackl, any transfer or encumbrance was contingent
on the approval of third parties.36
The Price court held that even if the donees,
whose status was unclear, became limited partners,
contingencies stood between the donees and their
receipt of economic value.37
Finally, the court rejected the taxpayers’ argu-
ment that by including the transferred property in
their Schedule K-1 as an asset, the donees had a
present interest in the transferred assets because
they thereby increased their ability to borrow. The
court described that contention as unsubstantiated,
contingent, and speculative, because of the FLP
agreement transfer restrictions.38 Moreover, the FLP
agreement’s discretionary distributions were con-
trary to a finding of a continual and determinable
stream of income to the donees, particularly in light
of the principal purpose of the FLP. Finally, the
court said there was no fiduciary duty to make
income distributions because under Nebraska law a
fiduciary owes assignees, the most likely status of
the donees in Price, only the duties of loyalty and
due care.39
Trusts and the Annual Exclusion
Section 2503(b) is centered on the beneficiary’s
actual rights — that is, the rights that are clearly
enforceable by the donee and that don’t depend on
the actions or intentions of the donor or a third
party. In a trust, when an interest depends on the
discretion of someone other than a beneficiary, the
value of that interest is unascertainable.40
Likewise, in a trust, when the trustee has the
power — and often the duty — to invest in both
income-producing and non-income-producing as-
sets, courts (as the Tax Court did in Calder) have
denied the donor an annual exclusion.41
The time to determine eligibility for the annual
exclusion is when the gift is complete. The analysis
is not an ex post facto look, and it requires exam-
ining the donee’s rights at the time of the transfer.
Actual events may confirm the allowance or disal-
lowance of an annual exclusion, but qualification
for the annual exclusion is determined when the
gift is complete. Post-gift receipt of income may
merely indicate what fortuitously happened as a
result of owning an asset; if the donee can’t control
whether an unproductive asset is sold and replaced
33Price, T.C. Memo. 2010-2 at 5, n.3.
34Id. at 5.
35Id. at 6-7.
36Id. at 11-12.
37Id. at 14.
38Id. at 16.
39Id. at 18-19.
40See reg. section 25.2503(b)-3(c), Example 1 (‘‘Under the
terms of a trust created by A the trustee is directed to pay the net
income to B, so long as B shall live. The trustee is authorized in
his discretion to withhold payments of income during any
period he deems advisable and add such income to the trust
corpus. Since B’s right to receive the income payments is subject
to the trustee’s discretion, it is not a present interest and no
exclusion is allowable with respect to the transfer in trust’’);
Example 3 (‘‘Under the terms of a trust created by E the net
income is to be distributed to E’s three children in such shares as
the trustee, in his uncontrolled discretion deems advisable.
While the terms of the trust provide that all of the net income is
to be distributed, the amount of income any one of the three
beneficiaries will receive rests entirely within the trustee’s
discretion and cannot be presently ascertained. Accordingly, no
exclusions are allowable with respect to the transfers to the
trust’’).
41See, e.g., Fischer v. Commissioner, 288 F.2d 574 (3d Cir. 1961).
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by income-producing property, she does not have a
present interest in the income from that property.
Analysis and Conclusion
Like Hackl and Price, Wimmer held that gifts of
restricted FLP interests do not qualify for the annual
exclusion. However, the court also held that be-
cause the donees had the right to income distribu-
tions when the donor made gifts of the income
streams, he made present interest gifts that quali-
fied for the annual exclusion.
Applying the three-part test of Disston, quoted in
Calder, the Wimmer court did not convincingly ex-
plain how the donor satisfied the first and third part
of that test. When the court held that the partners
had a fiduciary duty to invest in dividend-
producing assets and that the general partners were
therefore required to distribute income to the do-
nees, the court took several leaps in logic to arrive at
its conclusion: ‘‘This investment, when combined
with partnership purposes to increase partners’ net
worth and transfer wealth using the annual gift tax
exclusion, suggests that the partnership was created
with the intent to make periodic distributions to the
limited partners.’’42
The FLP agreement did not require that the FLP
retain income-producing investments. That one of
the purposes of the FLP was to invest in marketable
securities does not equate with a purpose to invest
in dividend-paying marketable securities, because
many marketable securities do not produce income
and even those that do may stop producing income.
While it is true that the FLP’s sole asset was in fact
dividend-paying stock, the stated purpose of the
FLP was to invest in assets such as ‘‘stock, bonds,
notes, securities, and other personal property and
real estate’’ the FLP was not required to hold
income-producing assets or to convert any non-
income producing property into income-producing
assets; likewise, there is no stated FLP purpose to
provide income for the limited partners.
That the partners wanted to avail themselves of
the annual gift tax exclusion does not mean that the
taxpayer’s transfers would qualify for the exclusion.
The court did not discuss where in the FLP agree-
ment or under applicable state law there was a
stated purpose or requirement either that invest-
ments be income producing or that the limited
partners could demand that the FLP convert non-
income-producing assets into income-producing
ones.
That income was paid to the donees as owners of
their FLP interests is insufficient; the donee’s actual
right to income must have been clear from the time
of the donor’s gift. The court’s statement that ‘‘the
expectation that some portion of partnership in-
come would flow steadily to the limited partners is
supported by the general partners’ fiduciary duties
owed to the trustee of the Grandchildren Trust’’ is
not the same as the donees having an actual right to
demand that the general partners acquire only
income-producing property. In Calder, the donor
maintained that under the state law governing the
trusts, the trustees had a fiduciary duty to sell those
assets and acquire income-producing property; yet
that argument failed to convince the court that the
donees had an income right (that is, the first part of
the Disston test).
Thus, while the Wimmers ‘‘won’’ annual exclu-
sions for their gifts, under a trust analogy, it is not
clear from the opinion that they were actually
entitled to them.42T.C. Memo. 2012-157 at 12-13, n.9.
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